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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
CONTRACTS
Because of the lack of significant opinions rendered on Contracts
during the period covered by this survey, Professor Joe H. Munster, Jr.
has not submitted an article this year.
THE EDITORS
CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND ASSOCIATIONS
The significant decisions in this section of the 1962 survey of Ohio
law are highlighted by: (1) a relaxation of the formalities required for
director action, (2) a strict interpretation of the rule that dissolution does
not terminate a corporation's obligations, (3) a consideration of what is
a "successor" corporation, and (4) an imposing number of unfair com-
petition cases.
APPROVAL OF CORPORATE CONTRACTS
Ohio Revised Code section 1701.54 is a practical answer to the in-
formal internal proceedings of most closely-held corporations. It permits
directors as well as shareholders to take any action without a meeting
which could be taken at a meeting.' At the same time, the legislature
has indicated its intention to make action without a meeting more diffi-
cult by requiring that approval of such action be both written and unani-
mous.
2
In Piening v. Titus, Inc.3 the unanimous approval requirement was
relaxed considerably and the writing requirement waived. The corpora-
tion involved had three shareholders, and two of them were also directors
of the corporation. The non-director shareholder dissented from a change
in corporate purpose and demanded the fair cash value of her shares. An
offer to purchase the dissenter's shares was made by letter, signed by the
company vice-president, a director-shareholder. The letter constituted his
consent in both capacities to the offer. The evidence was conflicting as
to whether the third shareholder, the company president, a director-share-
holder, had also consented. If he did consent it was merely an oral au-
thorization to his attorney who drafted the letter.
The court of appeals held that the president was accustomed to allow-
ing his attorney to make decisions for him, and that there was sufficient
1. For a discussion of the reasons for the general rule that directors must act formally as a
board, see 2 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 394.1 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1954).
2. See comments to OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.54 (Supp. 1962).
3. 113 Ohio App. 532, 179 N.E.2d 374 (1960).
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evidence that the offer had his explicit or implicit consent. The decision
says nothing about the consent of the third director, the president's
daughter. The court ruled, however, that there was sufficient evidence
that the unanimous consent requirement of the statute had been met.
But, the court disregarded the statute's second requirement, that the con-
sent be in writing and signed by all directors and shareholders. Waiver
of the writing requirement was apparently based on the court's decision
that the corporation should not be able to utilize its own faulty informal
procedures to deny that it had entered into a valid contract. This result
seems justified by the apparent authority of the vice-president to make the
offer to purchase." Thus, the Piening case should not be relied on as
precedent that courts will make a practice of relaxing the requirements of
section 1701.54 in the future.
Another corporation found itself bound by the apparent authority of
a corporate officer in Goodride Tire Co. v. Albert-Harris, Inc.5 The pres-
ident of Albert-Harris had a far-reaching employment contract which
gave him almost complete control of the company's activities.6 The
corporation's regulations also gave him authority to sign contracts. Un-
der these circumstances, the court of appeals held that Albert-Harris could
not contest the president's apparent authority to sign notes binding the
company.
7
DISSOLUTION - ITS EFFECT ON CORPORATE BUSINESS
The general rule is that dissolution terminates the actual business life
for which a corporation has been created, but it does not terminate all
corporate business.8 "[Llike an individual after death, its activities must
be settled; its claims collected, its debts paid, its sums due the state satis-
fied."9 The strict adherence to this rule by Ohio courts is exemplified by
the recent decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Commonwealth Tel.
Co. v. Bowers."9
The Ohio public utility excise tax is a privilege tax levied on July 1
4. A corporation, like an individual, may find itself bound by the apparent authority of its
agent. 12 OHIo JuiR 2d Corporations § 404 (1955).
5. 114 Ohio App. 276, 181 N.E.2d 719 (1960).
6. The scope of authority of a corporation's agents is determined in the first instance from
their contracts of employment. 12 OHIo JuR. 2d Corporations § 404 (1955).
7. Another significant recent case which held that officers and directors of a closely-held
corporation frequently act informally, but nevertheless have authority to bind the corporation
is In re B-F Building Corp., 284 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1960). This case was discussed in the
1961 survey of Ohio law. See Gafford, Survey of Ohio Law - Corporations, Partnerships,
and Associations, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 457 (1962).
8. 13 OHIO JuR. 2d, Corporations § 936 (1955).
9. American Oak Leather Co. v. Peck, 63, 108 N-2d 179, 183 (Ohio B.T.A. 1951).
10. 174 Ohio St. 141, 187 N.E.2d 30 (1962).
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for the succeeding fiscal year.'1 In the case of a telephone company, the
tax is levied on the privilege of furnishing telephone service. Common-
wealth entered into an agreement to sell all of its assets to a new corpora-
tion controlled by General Telephone and Electronics. A certificate of
dissolution was filed by Commonwealth on June 30, 1960, but approval
of its plan of reorganization was not obtained from the Public Utilities
Commission until July 1, 1960. Commonwealth then conveyed its assets
to the new corporation on July 2, 1962.
The supreme court held that Commonwealth had operated for one
day in the 1960-1961 fiscal year, July 1, and must pay the entire 1960-
1961 excise tax of $36,174.60.12 The court pointed out that Common-
wealth existed to furnish telephone service to the public until the commis-
sion approved its plan of reorganization. Filing a certificate of dissolution
did not terminate its telephone business, so it was required to pay the ex-
ise tax.3
The Commonwealth decision points up the traditional procedure of
filing the certificate of dissolution first and then winding up the corpora-
tion's affairs. It is often better to reverse this procedure and wind up the
corporation's affairs before dissolving.' Dissolution cannot be relied
upon to terminate corporate obligations, or as shown by this decision,
even corporate business.
DISREGARD OF CORPORATE ENTITIES
Is an existing corporation the same corporation as the one which
preceded it? This question was presented to a common pleas court in
Richmond Heights Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross.'5
Ohio Revised Code section 1739.06 permits Blue Cross to offer a df-
ferent rate of reimbursement to non-profit hospitals which have been in
existence for a year or more than to those which have been in existence
for less than a year. Blue Cross had found it necessary to institute two
rate formulas because of the problems presented to hospitals in their first
year of operation. Richmond Heights General Hospital, a new corpora-
tion, asked the court to declare it to be the successor to Forest Hills Hos-
pital. This would permit Richmond Heights to qualify for the more
beneficial Blue Cross rate given to hospitals which have operated for a
11. OHIO REv. CODE §§ 5727.31, 5727.32(I).
12. Additional Ohio authorities on the effect of dissolution on a corporation's obligation to
pay taxes include American Oak Leather Co. v. Peck, 108 N.E.2d 179 (Ohio B.T.A. 1951)
and State v. Brown, 121 Ohio St. 73, 166 N.E. 903 (1929).
13. For a general discussion on the effect of dissolution on the payment of taxes see 16A
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 8129 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1961).
14. The timing of dissolution is irrelevant from a federal income tax standpoint. Rev. Rul.
54-518, 1954-2 Cu.L BuLL. 142.
15. 184 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
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year or more. Richmond Heights had taken over all of the personal
property and staff of Forest Hills and moved them to a new building.
This was the only physical change, but it was accompanied by a change
in legal entities.
The court held that the essential fact in determining whether Rich-
mond Heights was the successor to Forest Hills was not whether it was
the same legal entity as its predecessor but whether it was "continuing
in the experience of its predecessor."' 6 The court concluded that Rich-
mond Heights was the successor to Forest Hills, and that the change of
corporate articles was one of corporate form rather than substance."
Richmond Heights's staff had the experience of more than a year's opera-
don, and the court held that Richmond Heights should not be denied the
benefits of that experience simply because of a change in corporate form.
The court also seems to have indicated that corporate forms should be
disregarded to a greater degree when hospitals are involved than with
other corporations. "A hospital more so than other corporations is not
merely a group of stockholders.' 8
In another case involving a hospital, Shaker Medical Center Hosp.
v'. Blue Cross,9 a court of appeals again looked to the substance rather
than the form of a hospital's operations in determining the issue before
it. The court held that the mere fact that a hospital is incorporated not
for profit is not sufficient to qualify it as a "non-profit hospital."2 The
hospital also must be operated on a nonprofit basis. In this case the evi-
dence proved that the hospital was operated primarily for the benefit and
profit of the doctor who was the sole owner; therefore, it did not qualify
for Blue Cross assistance to "nonprofit hospitals."
UNFAIR COMPETITION
The problems involved in protecting trade names and trade secrets
and in avoiding situations from which liability might arise through the
wrongful use of the trade names and trade secrets of another, are well
illustrated by a variety of Ohio cases reported during the past year.
Trade Names
In National City Bank v. National City Window Cleaning Co." a
court of appeals held that a bank was entitled to an injunction to prevent
16. Id. at 628.
17. For discussions of what constitutes a "successor" corporation see Whitaker-Glessner Co.
v. Strick, 25 Ohio App. 415, 158 N.E. 554 (1927); 15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPOR-
ATIONS § 7203 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1961).
18. Richmond Heights Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 184 N.E.2d 626, 628 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
19. 115 Ohio App. 497, 183 N.E.2d 628 (1962).
20. OmoRv. CODE S 1739.01(B) (Supp. 1962).
21. 180 N.E.2d 20 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962), red &, remanded on other grounds, 174 Ohio
St. 510 (1963).
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a window cleaning company from using the words "National City" in its
name. The court found that the bank deserved this protection even
against a non-competitive business to prevent the public from being con-
fused into thinking that the window cleaning company had the bank's
sponsorship. This decision goes further in granting trade name protec-
tion from non-competitive businesses than any other previous Ohio de-
cision.22 It also goes further than the decisions of many other jurisdic-
tions.2"
Trade Secrets
The law is clear that even in the absence of an express contract, a
former employee or business associate may be enjoined from utilizing
trade secrets or "confidential information" revealed to him in confidence
during his employment.24 The problem generally presented to the courts
is: what is a trade secret, and what is "confidential information.""
In Commonwealth Sanitation Co. v. Commonwealth Pest Control
Co.2" the use of the trade name "Commonwealth" was enjoined but the
use of customer lists by two former employees was not. The former em-
ployer argued that his customer lists were "confidential" because restau-
rants and hotels which use pest control companies do not want the gen-
eral public to know that they have need for such services. The court held
that customer lists sometimes can be protected as "confidential"; how-
ever, what the customers think of the lists is not the determining factor.
What is important is the availability of the customers' names to the gen-
eral public. In this case anyone who had been associated with the pest
control business would know what types of customers to contact. One
22. In Henry Furnace Co. v. Kappelman, 91 Ohio App. 451, 108 N.E.2d 839 (1952), the
plaintiff's trade name was protected from a non-competitive business, but plaintiff and defend-
ant were both in the furnace business though one was a manufacturer and one a retailer. In
Hugo Stein Clock Co. v. S. B. Stein & Son, 58 Ohio App. 377, 16 N.E.2d 609 (1937), pro-
tection from a non-competitive business was also given to plaintiff's trade name. However,
despite the fact that plaintiff and defendant sold non-competitive products, they were both
retailers located on the same street within close proximity of each other.
23. In the recent case of Wills v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 118 N.W.2d 954 (Mich.
1963), the Michigan Supreme Court refused to grant an injunction to stop a ski area from
using the name "Alpine," which had been used for six years by the plaintiff, a sports shop.
The sports shop, among other things, sold ski clothing and ski equipment. The court ruled
that the businesses were non-competitive and that the evidence presented did not indicate that
the use of the same name by both businesses would so confuse the public as to substantially
injure the sports shop.
24. Annot., 165 A.L.R. 1453 (1946); Hance v. Peacock, 169 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
A former employee may use his "experience, skill, acumen, memory and general knowledge" to
engage in a competitive business, but he may not reveal trade secrets related to him in con-
fidence by a former employer. Perfect Measure Tape Co. v. Notheis, 93 Ohio App. 507, 513,
114 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1953).
25. For a definition of "trade secrets" see 52 OHIO JtmI 2d Trade Secrets § 1 (1962).
26. 178 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
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could do so by looking up restaurant and hotel numbers in a telephone
book. The court concluded that lists compiled in this manner are not
"confidential" and their use would not be enjoined.
In Stranges v. Fliehman27 a former partner entered into the same busi-
ness as the dissolved partnership from which he had been bought out and
began soliciting its customers. The other partner sought an injunction
to prevent the solicitation on the basis that it was impairing the business's
good will. Unlike the Commonwealth case, there was no contention that
customer lists were confidential nor that a similar business name was
being used. The court held that in the absence of an agreement not to
compete, the former partner had an absolute right to engage in the same
business, provided he did not represent himself to be the successor to the
business and entitled to its good will.
A change of employment may result not only in a charge of the un-
authorized use of trade secrets by a former employee and his new em-
ployer, but the new employer may be charged with the unauthorized
pirating of employees for the purpose of obtaining trade secrets. These
charges were made by the B. F. Goodrich Company after a key man in
its space suit program was hired by International Latex. However, a
common pleas court ruled that
the mere fact that a former employee or one who possesses a trade secret
has accepted employment with a rival manufacturer isn't sufficient to
warrant an injunction against the employee unless the circumstances are
such as to persuade one that the ulterior purpose of such hiring is evil.28
The court went on to hold that B. F. Goodrich had failed to prove that
its former employee had been pirated away to obtain trade secrets and
had failed to prove that the employee had actually revealed any trade
secrets.29 On this basis, the injunction was denied.
This brief survey indicates that Ohio courts have gone further than
many jurisdictions in granting trade name protection. At the same time,
the difficulties of proving that information in the hands of a former
associate or employee qualifies for trade secret or "confidential informa-
tion" protection should be evident.
27. 182 N.E.2d 19 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
28. The case has not been officially reported but is discussed in the Wall Street Journal, Feb.
25, 1963, p. 8, col. 5.
29. Another recent suit concerning the pirating of employees was filed by the First California
Co. against Eastman Dillon, Union Securities & Co. First California sought two million
dollars from Eastman Dillon for conspiring with several First California employees to hire
away other First California employees for the purpose of expanding Eastman Dillon's Cali-
fornia accounts. The case was recently settled. Corporation-Law and Tax Report 2 (Dec. 31,
1962). However, it points up the fact that while individual employees may be recruited from
competitors, where there are no long-term employment contracts involved, it is unlawful to
recruit as a part of a general conspiracy to take over a part of the competitor's operations.
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